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Income Tax: Kenseth v. Commissioner: The Assignment
of Income Doctrine and Its Misapplication to Contingent
Attorneys' Fees
Introduction
In Kenseth v. Commissioner,' a taxpayer received $229,501 as a settlement award
under the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) of 1967.2 Of the
total settlement, the taxpayer paid $91,800 to his attorney pursuant to a contingent
fee agreement. How much of the settlement award must the taxpayer claim as
income when filing his federal income tax return? There are two alternative
solutions to the problem. First, the taxpayer could exclude from gross income the
portion of the settlement award paid as attorneys' fees? Second, the taxpayer could

report the entire settlement, including the portion paid for attorneys' fees, as gross
income while claiming an itemized deduction for the portion paid as attorneys'
fees.4 The latter option imposes the greater tax burden upon taxpayers.' In
Kenseth, the Tax Court had the opportunity to resolve this issue.6 To taxpayers'

dismay, the majority of the Tax Court chose the latter option.7 The result is not
necessarily surprising because the Tax Court has consistently followed this rule.'
However, some circuit courts disagree with the Tax Court's position,9 and some
circuits have not yet had the opportunity to decide the issue." Hopefully, the

1. 114 T.C. 399 (2000).
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-633a (1994).
3. See Deborah A. Geier, Some Meandering Thoughts on Plaintiffs and Their Attorneys' Fees and
Costs, 88 TAX NOTES 16, 531, 532 (2000).
4. See id.
5. Application of §§ 56,67, and 68 of the Internal Revenue Code often interact to allow a taxpayer
an itemized deduction for only a portion of the total expense incurred. See infra notes 12-17 and
accompanying text; see also I.R.C. §§ 56, 67, 68 (2000).
6. See Kenseth, 114 T.C. at 407; see also Coady v. Comm'r, 213 F.3d 1187, 1190 (9th Cir. 2000);
Baylin v. United States, 30 Fed. Cl. 248 (1993). But see Estate of Clarks ex rel Brisco-Whitter v. United
States, 202 F.3d 854, 856 (6th Cir. 2000); Cotnam v. Comm'r, 263 F.2d 119, 121 (5th Cir. 1959).
7. Kenseth, 114 T.C. at 407, 417. The majority was only an eight-to-five majority. Robert W.
Wood, Leave Section 83 Out of This Mess, 89 TAX NOTES 1187, 1187 (2000).
8. See Bagley v. Comm'r, 105 T.C. 396, 419 (1995), affd, 121 F.3d 393 (8th Cir. 1997); O'Brien
v. Comm'r, 38 T.C. 707, 712 (1962), affd per curiam, 319 F.2d 532 (3d Cir. 1963).
9. See Clarks, 202 F.3d at 857; Cotnam, 263 F.2d at 121.
10. A taxpayer can either bring suit in the United States Tax Court, the United States District Court,
or the United States Court of Federal Claims. See JAMES J. FREELAND ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF
FEDERAL INCOME TAxATION 971-72 [hereinafter FUNDAMENTALS] (11th ed. 2000); see also I.R.C. §§
7441, 7443 (2000). Lawsuits filed in Tax Court or Federal Claims Court are tried without a jury. See
FUNDAMENTALS, supra, at 971-72. In cases tried before a United States district court, a jury determines
the factual issues. See id. If a tax issue is decided in Tax Court or a United States district court, all
appeals are made to the appropriate circuit court of appeals. See id. at 975-76; see also I.R.C. § 7482
(2000). However, taxpayers must appeal decisions of the United States Court of Federal Claims to the
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United States Supreme Court will decide the issue in the near future and resolve the
current state of confusion resulting from the conflicting decisions of courts across

the country."
The reason for the existing controversy is that the two alternatives have
significantly different consequences to the taxpayer. For example, assume a
taxpayer enters into a contingent fee agreement with his attorney whereby the
attorney will receive 30% of any lawsuit proceeds. If the taxpayer wins a $100,000
settlement award, the attorney automatically receives $30,000 and the taxpayer
receives the remaining $70,000. Under the first alternative, the taxpayer would
simply include $70,000 in his gross income. Thus, he would pay tax on the amount
that he actually received and no more. However, under the approach adopted by the
Tax Court in Kenseth, the taxpayer would have to include the entire $100,000 in his
gross income even though he only received $70,000. Although the taxpayer could
claim as an itemized deduction the $30,000 paid in attorneys' fees, several sections
of the Internal Revenue Code interact to reduce the amount allowed as itemized
deductions.'" The relevant sections are § 56," which governs adjustments in
computing the alternative minimum tax (AMT); § 67,"s which imposes a 2% floor
on itemized deductions; and § 68,"6 which imposes the overall limitation on
itemized deductions. The application of these provisions lies at the heart of the
controversy because if contingent fees exceed 50% of the total recovery, the
taxpayer could incur a tax liability exceeding 100% of the amount received from
settlement proceeds.' 7

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. See FUNDAMENTALS, supra, at 975-76.
11. Article 1, Section 8, Clause I of the United States Constitution requires that the federal taxing
power be uniform in application throughout the United States. See FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 10, at
15; see also Lawrence v. Conum'r, 27 T.C. 713, 716 (1957) (holding that the Tax Court did not have to
follow appellate court decisions on law in later cases involving the same issue). But see Golsen v.
Comm'r, 54 T.C. 742, 756-57 (1970) (reversing the Tax Court's position as described in Lawrence and
stating that the Tax Court would start deciding future cases based on the applicable appellate court
decisions).
12. See Geier, supra note 3, at 532 (noting that § 68 of the Internal Revenue Code can reduce a
taxpayer's itemized deductions by up to 80% under the regular tax system). However, the biggest threat
to taxpayers comes from the alternative minimum tax system, not the regular tax system. Id.;
see also
Kenseth, 114 T.C. at 407; Jon Forman, Tax Treatment of ContingentLegal Fees, J. REC.(Okla. City),
Sept. 5, 2000, at 19.
13. See I.R.C. §§ 56, 67, 68 (2000); see also Kenseth, 114 T.C. at 425-26 (Beghe, J.,
dissenting).
14. I.R.C. § 56 (2000).
15. Id. § 67.
16. Id. § 68.
17. Kenseth, 114 T.C. at 425-26 (Beghe, J.,
dissenting); see also Robert W. Wood, The Plight of
the Plaintiff. The Tax Treatment of Legal Fees, 98 TAX NoTES TODAY 220-101, 9N 4-6, Nov. 16, 1998,
available at LEXIS, 98 TNT 220-101 (commenting on the interaction of revenue laws and the
deductibility of legal fees). See generally Burgess J.W. Raby & William L. Raby, Deducting Legal
Fees - Before-Tax and After-Tax, 79 TAX NOTES 1295, 1298 (1998) (discussing the application of the
AMT to contingent attorneys' fees arising out of business litigation). Tax scholars state:
If the contingent fee is not deductible in arriving at AGI, and the AMT applies to the
total amounts involved, nondeductibilhy at the 28 percent AMT rate means that what
appears to be a 33-1/3 percent contingent fee is actually a 46.3 percent after-tax
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Due to the limitations on deductions, the result of including the entire amount as
gross income can be extremely unfair to the taxpayers." The Tax Court stated that
the unfair result can only be corrected if Congress reforms the Internal Revenue
Code. 9 However, the Tax Court based its reasoning upon a judge-made doctrine
the assignment of income doctrine. Some courts believe the assignment of
income doctrine should not apply to cases like Kenseth. This note identifies why
the Tax Court erred in its conclusion and why the assignment of income doctrine
should not apply to cases with factual circumstances like Kenseth. Part I of this
note outlines the applicable provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, while Part II
explains the assignment of income doctrine. Part III reviews previous case law, and
Part IV explains the holding and reasoning of the Kenseth decision. Finally, Part
V of this note sets forth a counterargument to the Kenseth decision and explains
possible solutions to the issue.
L Applicable Internal Revenue Code Provisions
A. Section 61(a) of the Internal Revenue Code
The starting point in any income tax issue turns on how much and what items the
taxpayer must include in gross income. Section 61" of the Internal Revenue Code
is the section that answers this question. Section 61(a) specifically states, "Except
as otherwise provided in this subtitle, gross income means all income from whatever
source derived."" The section then goes on to give a list of certain items that
represent gross income. This list includes compensation for services, commissions,
and fringe benefits.' Courts have interpreted § 61 broadly. If an item of income
falls under § 61(a), it will be included in gross income unless a separate section of
the Internal Revenue Code specifically exempts the item from inclusion in gross

contingent fee. In other words, a $1 million recovery will cost $280,000 in tax. Thus, the
after-tax amount is $720,000. The nondeductible $333,333 fee that was withheld from the
S million is 46.3 percent of the net recovery, after tax. If the fee is based on the gross
recovery and expenses are charged against the client's portion of the recovery, the
effective contingent fee rate is even greater. Thus, if the lawyer were reimbursed,
expenses of $100,000 in addition to the $333,333, the recovery still costs $280,000 in tax,
but the after-tax net to the taxpayer turns out to be only $620,000 before reflecting the
attorney's fee. That fee is then 53.76 percent after tax. If the lawyer's third is calculated
after the $100,000, then the fee is only $300,000 (1/3 of $900,000) and is 48.4 percent
of the after-tax recovery.
Id. at 1298.
18. The plaintiffs most affected by these tax consequences are employees who receive awards from
their employers in employment litigation. See Geier, supra note 3, at 533. Other affected individuals
include those recovering awards that are not excludable under § 104(a)(2), including punitive damages
and postjudgment interest from which attorneys' fees are paid. See id
19. Kenseth v. Comm'r, 114 T.C. 399, 407 (2000).
20. I.R.C. § 61 (2000).
21. Id "Gross income means all income from whatever source derived, unless excluded by law.
Gross income includes income realized in any form, whether in money, property, or services." Treas.
Reg. § 1.61-1(a) (1957).

22. I.R.C. § 61(a)(1) (2000).
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income.' In Kenseth, the Tax Court decided that § 61(a) includes the entire
settlement award the taxpayer received whether or not the taxpayer pays a portion
of the settlement as an attorney's fee.
B. Sections 67 and 68 of the Internal Revenue Code
The next issue becomes whether and how much of a deduction the taxpayer can
claim for attorneys' fees. The Tax Court ruled that Mr. Kenseth could claim an
itemized deduction for the amount of his attorneys' fees. The Internal Revenue Code
provides that taxpayers can claim the greater of their itemized deductions or the
standard deduction allowed by the Internal Revenue Code.' Absent application of
either § 67 or § 68, allowance of an itemized deduction for attorneys' fees would
have the same result as simply excluding the amount from gross income. However,
the Internal Revenue Code does not operate this way, and the application of §§ 67
and 68 to itemized deductions caused the unfair result in Kenseth. Section 67
imposes a 2% floor on a taxpayer's miscellaneous itemized deductions for the
year. Thus, a taxpayer can only take a deduction from gross income for that
portion of the contingent attorneys' fees (in addition to any other miscellaneous
itemized deductions) that exceeds 2% of the taxpayer's adjusted gross income for
the year.27 In addition, § 68 imposes a further limitation on the amount of itemized
deductions allowed for individuals with income above a specified amount.' Under
§ 68, the total amount of itemized deductions otherwise allowed is reduced by a
certain percentage,' which shall not exceed 80% of the total itemized deductions
for the year." After application of §§ 67 and 68, taxpayers certainly will not be
left with a deduction for the total amount of attorneys' fees. Unfortunately, the
limitations do not end there.

23. Id. § 61(a); see also Comm'r v. Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. 427, 430 (1955); Old Colony Trust
Co. v. Comm'r, 279 U.S. 716, 729 (1929).
24. See I.R.C. § 63 (2000).
25. See Kenseth v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 399,407 (2000); see also 3 FED. TAx BuLL. 12 (2000),
available at LEXIS, 2000 Fed. Tax Bull. 140 ("While the taxpayer was entitled to a miscellaneous
itemized deduction for the fees, the application of the 2-percent limitation, the overall itemized deduction
limitations, and the alternative minimum tax resulted in the taxpayer going home with very little of the
settlement award in the end.").
26. See I.R.C. § 67 (2000).
27. See id.
28. Id. § 68.
29. Id. § 68(a). Section 68(a) states:
In the case of an individual whose adjusted gross income exceeds the applicable
amount, the amount of the itemized deductions otherwise allowable for the taxable year
shall be reduced by the lesser of 3 percent of the excess of adjusted gross income over the applicable amount, or
80 percent of the amount of the itemized deductions otherwise allowable for such
taxable year.
id. Section 68(b) sets forth the applicable amount described in § 68(a) and it is adjusted for inflation.

Id. § 68(b).
30. Id.§ 68(a)(2).
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C. Section 56 of the InternalRevenue Code
Another part of the Internal Revenue Code, the alternative minimum tax

(AMT), ' actually adds additional tax liability on top of the regular tax liability."
When the alternative minimum tax exceeds the taxpayer's regular tax liability, the
taxpayer must pay both the regular tax plus the portion of the alternative minimum

tax in excess thereof.3 3 Section 56 governs the adjustments required in computing

the alternative minimum tax.' However, § 56 does not allow deductions for any
miscellaneous itemized deductions. 5 Because attorneys' fees are classified as
miscellaneous itemized deductions, they are not deducted in the AMT computation.
Thus, § 56 increases the tax burden of those subject to the AMT by including the

entire settlement award in gross income and not allowing any deduction for the
attorneys' fees. These Internal Revenue Code sections help demonstrate the
negative effect of the Kenseth decision. However, the Kenseth court premised its

decision upon the assignment of income doctrine.
II. Assignment of Income Doctrine
The U.S. Supreme Court created the assignment of income doctrine over sixty
years ago in Lucas v. Ear" to prevent taxpayers from engaging in tax avoidance
schemes." Tax avoidance most often occurs in intrafamily transfers whereby a

family member in a high tax bracket assigns income to a family member who falls
into a lower tax bracket." In Lucas, a husband and wife entered an agreement that
31. See id. § 55.
32. See id.
33. Id.
34. ld. § 56. Section 56 is not the only section of the Internal Revenue Code that governs
computation of the alternative minimum tax. Section 58 sets forth additional adjustments to a taxpayer's
regular taxable income required in determining the alternative minimum tax. Id. § 58. Section 57 lists
"tax preference" items that are added before calculating the alternative minimum tax. Id. § 57.
35. Id. § 56(b)(l)(A)(i).
36. See Laura Sager & Stephen Cohen, How the Income Tax Undermines Civil Rights Law, 73 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1075, 1077 (2000) (noting that a plaintiff "must report her entire recovery as income.
However, the attorney's fees - the cost of producing the income - are not fully deductible under the
regular tax and are not deductible at all under the alternative minimum tax.") (emphasis added). The
following illustration clarifies the problem:
If the ratio of attorney's fees to the entire recovery is high enough, a before-tax gain
may metamorphose into an after-tax loss ... for example, the plaintiff settled a state law
employment claim for $250,000 but incurred $245,000 in attorney's fees, for a pre-tax
profit of $5,000. Under the AMT, the entire $250,000 recovery was taxable but none of
the $245,000 in attorney's fees was deductible. If we assume that the taxpayer files jointly
and has no other income, his AMT liability would be $53,900. Under these assumptions,
the nondeductibility of the employee's attorney's fees under the AMT would convert a
$5,000 before-tax gain into a $48,900 after-tax loss.
Id. at 1078 (footnotes omitted).
37. 281 U.S. Ill (1930); see also Ronald H. Jensen, Schneer v. Commissioner. Continuing
Confusion over the Assignment of Income Doctrineand PersonalService Income, I FLA. TAX REv. 623,
624 (1993).
38. See Lucas, 281 U.S. at 114-15.
39. See Jenson, supra note 37, at 631-32; see also Kenseth v. Conmr, 114 T.C. 399, 441 (2000)
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granted to each spouse one-half of the income earned from the other spouse.4 On
his tax return for the year in question, the husband claimed only one-half of the
income he earned. ' The Supreme Court held that an individual cannot avoid
paying tax on income he earned by making an anticipatory assignment of that
income to another person.!z Therefore, the husband was responsible for paying the
entire tax liability on all of his earned income regardless of any separate agreement
limiting his access to or use of the money. The assignment of income doctrine
means that a person cannot avoid paying tax through an "arrangement, by which
43
fruits are attributed to a different tree from that on which they grew."
The facts of Lucas involved a gratuitous assignment of personal service income.
In Helvering v. Horst," the Supreme Court applied the assignment of income
doctrine to gratuitous assignments of investment income. In Horst, the taxpayer, an
owner of negotiable bonds, detached from them the interest coupons and gave them
to his son shortly before their due date." Although the interest on the bonds was
thereafter paid to the son,' the Court required the taxpayer to include the interest in
his gross income.4 The Court viewed the taxpayer, not the recipient of the gift, as
realizing the income: "[H]e, who owns or controls the source of the income, also
controls the disposition of that which he could have received himself and diverts the
payment from himself to others as the means of procuring the satisfaction of his
wants."47 The taxpayer did realize the income for tax purposes because he enjoyed
a benefit from it; he gave a gift to his son. "Such a use of his economic gain...
to procure a satisfaction which can be obtained only by the expenditure of money
or property, would seem to be the enjoyment of the income whether the satisfaction
is the purchase of goods ... or gifts to his son."" Case law that developed after
Horst intimates that the assignor can avoid paying taxes on the assigned income as
long as the assignor also assigns the property producing such income.' Thus, the
taxpayer in Horst could have avoided tax liability for the interest by assigning both

(Beghe, J., dissenting).
40. Lucas, 281 U.S. at 114.
41. Id.

42. Id. "A gratuitous anticipatory assignment of income does not shift the burden of taxation and
the donor is taxable when the income is received by the donee." Tax Analysts, Amounts Not Received
from Employer Are Income, 8 INS. TAX REV. 728 (1994), available at LEXIS, 8 Ins. Tax Rev. 728
(discussing the application of the assignment of income doctrine to certain employment health benefit
options); see also Tax Analysts, Payments to Former Wife from Husband's Nonqualified Deferred
Compensation Account Are Taxable to Husband, Tax Analysts, 61 TAx NoTEs 311, 319 (1993)
(discussing Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-40-032 (Oct. 18, 1993)).
43. Lucas, 281 U.S. at 115.
44. 311 U.S. 112 (1940); see also 5 MERTENS LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATIoN § 24A:42.15
(Kenneth G. Zaleski rev., 2001), WL 5 Mertens 24A:42.15 [hereinafter MERTENS] (noting that Horst is
the second Supreme Court case that "shaped the assignment-of-income doctrine").
45. Horst, 311 U.S. at 114.
46. Id. at 114-16, 120.
47. Id. at 116-17.

48. Id. at 117.
49. See Jenson, supranote 37, at 631. However, even if the taxpayer assigns the income-producing
property, the taxpayer will be taxed on income accrued prior to the assignment. Id.
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the negotiable bonds and the interest coupons to his son. Case law prior to Kenseth
is divided on the issue of how and when the assignment of income doctrine should
apply to various factual situations.
Il.Prior Case Law
A. CircititCourts FindingThat the Assignment of Income Doctrine Does Not Apply
to Payment of Attorneys' Fees
1.Fifth Circuit
In Cotnam v. Commissioner," the Fifth Circuit adopted the position that the
portion of a judgment used to pay attorneys' fees should not be included in the gross
income of the taxpayer.5 In Cotnam, a man offered to give Mrs. Cotnam one-fifth
of his estate if she would provide care and friendship to him until his death.' Mrs.
Cotnam agreed and served the man until his death, four and one-half years later.'
The man died without a will, and Mrs. Cotnam sued the estate for the amount he
promised her. The court awarded Mrs. Cotnam $120,000.5' Pursuant to a
contingency agreement, Mrs. Cotnam paid $50,365 to her attorneys." She did not
include the attorneys' fees in her gross income, and the Commissioner issued a
deficiency. '
The Cotnam court held that the taxpayer did not have to include in gross income
the portion of her settlement paid as attorneys' fees. The Alabama Code provided
that "attorneys ...have the same right and power over said suits, judgments and
decrees, to enforce their liens, as their clients had or may have for the amount due
thereon to them."' The court reasoned that this gave attorneys a lien on any
judgment, prohibiting Cotnam from ever having an entitlement to that portion of the
settlement." Thus, she never realized any income attributable to the contingency
fee arrangement? Cotnam's agreement to pay 40% of any judgment to her

50. 263 F.2d 119 (5th Cir. 1959).

51. Id. at 121; see also Thad Austin Davis, Cotnam v. Commissioner and the Income Tax Treatment
of Contingency-Based Attorneys' Fees - The Alabama Attorneys Charging Lien Meets Lucas v. Earl
Head-on, 51 ALA. L. REv. 1683, 1700 (2000).
52. Cotnam, 263 F.2d at 120.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 121.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 125; see also Davis, supranote 51, at 1716-20 (discussing the attorney lien laws of other
states and how they compare to the Alabama statute analyzed in Cotnam); Robert W. Wood, Even Tax
Court Itself Divided on Attorney's Fees Issue!, 88 TAX NOTES 573 (2000) (stating the various cases that
have evaluated state law on attorney liens).
59. Cotnar, 263 F.2d at 125; see also Davis, supra note 51, at 1705 ("[Olther courts addressing the
issue have neglected two lines of cases that support Comam ....The Supreme Court's decision in Poe
v. Seaborn endorsed the position that state property law can trump general income tax principles when
examining who has the right to earned income.").
60. Cotnam. 263 F.2d at 125.
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attorneys did not amount to an assignment of income for several reasons. First,
although Cotnam did have a right to be paid for the services she rendered, without
assistance of counsel, her claim was worthless.6 Cotnam had not received any
income or even a right to income at the time she hired her attorneys. 2 In fact, she
relinquished 40% long before she was ever awarded any income.' The only
benefit she could enjoy from the income was the ability to hire attorneys so that she
might have a chance to recover a part of it. '
2. Sixth Circuit
The Sixth Circuit also adheres to the view that attorneys' fees are not included
in the gross income of a taxpayer. The court reinforced this view in January 2000
when it heard the case of Estate of Clarks v. United States.65 Arthur Clarks
instituted a personal injury suit against K-Mart and was awarded $5,600,000 in
damages plus $5,707,837 interest.' Clarks paid a portion of the contingent
attorneys' fees from the interest and excluded this amount from gross income on his
tax return.67 The Commissioner issued a deficiency, and the taxpayer took the issue
to court. For the following reasons, the court determined that the taxpayer did not
have to include the attorneys' fees in gross income. First, Michigan had a common
law attorneys' lien, and the court found it operated like the Alabama lien in
Cotnam." Clarks did own and control the claim of personal injury; however,
Clarks relinquished his right to any payment from the lawyer's portion of the
judgment." The value of Clarks' claim, if any, could not be determined at the time
Clarks reached the contingent fee agreement with the attorney." Furthermore, the
taxpayer could not realize any value without the assistance of counsel.17' The court
reasoned that the only economic benefit that Clarks enjoyed from the contingent
portion of the settlement award was to hire an attorney to retrieve the remaining

61. Id.; see also MERTENS, supra note 44, § 24A:42.16.
62. Cotnam, 263 F.2d at 125.
63. See id.
64. See id. at 126; see also MERTENS, supra note 44, § 24A:42.15 (stating that the assignment of
income doctrine "'can have no just or realistic application to a case like this, where the only economic
benefit to the taxpayer was as an aid to the collection of a part of an otherwise worthless claim'").
65. 202 F.3d 854 (6th Cir. 2000). But see Srivastava v. Comm'r, 220 F.3d 353 (5th Cir. 2000);
Coady v. Comm'r, 213 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000); Johnston v. Commr, 80 T.C.M. (CCH) 477 (2000).
66. Clarks, 202 F.3d at 855.
67. Id. According to the contingent fee agreement, Clarks owed his attorneys one-third of the total
recovery. Id. Clarks paid $1,865,156 from the original damages and $1,901,314 from the interest. Id.
The issue in the case only concerned the attorneys' fees paid from the interest because personal injury
damages are excluded from gross income under § 104(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code. Id.; see also
I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (2000).
68. Clarks, 202 F.3d at 856; see also Cotnam, 263 F.2d at 124.
69. Clarks, 202 F.3d at 856.
70. Id at 857.

71. Id. "When attorney and client enter a contingent fee agreement, the amount of the ultimate
recovery is unknown; the recovery isdetermined... [by] the experience and skill of the attorney (which]
results both in some recovery and in an increase in the value of that recovery." Kenseth v. Comm'r, 114
T.C. 399, 447 (2000) (Beghe, J., dissenting).
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settlement.' The court held that a contingent agreement bears more similarity to a
joint venture or partnership than to an assignment: "Clarks contracted for services
and assigned his lawyer a one-third interest in the venture in order that he might
have a chance to recover the remaining two-thirds."' Thus, he contingent
agreement created a lien in favor of Clarks' lawyer for one-third of any judgment
recovered, and the court determined that this lien transferred ownership of that
portion of the judgment to Clarks' lawyer.' Because Clarks did not own the
portion subject to the lien, he did not have to include it in his gross income.
Next, the court determined that the assignment of income doctrine did not
apply." In reaching this conclusion, the court compared the facts in Lucas v. Earl
to the instant facts. In Lucas, the assignor of the income had already earned the
income and was "relatively certain"'7 to be paid. The assignor gave the income to
a family member as a gift to enable the assignor to avoid a higher tax bracket."
The assignor knew the value of the income, and the assignee did not perform any
services in exchange for the income.' Finally, the underlying purpose in Lucas
was tax avoidance.' The court viewed the facts in Clarks entirely different from
the facts in Lucas. Clarks had no vested interest in the income and did not even
know the value of the potential award.' Also, Clarks did not know if he would
receive any money from the litigation."' Therefore, Clarks did not try to shift
income or avoid paying tax. In fact, whereas the donee of a gift does not have to
pay any tax, the lawyer in Clarks did have to pay tax on the "assigned" income.'
Both the client and the attorney paid tax on the same amount of money. Upon
reaching the conclusion that the payment of attorneys' fees did not constitute an
assignment of income, the court reasoned that it was instead a joint venture or a
division of property.U The lawyer owned the income and would not have received
his portion if he had not completed his professional duties."

72. Clarks, 202 F.3d at 857.
73. Id.

74. Id. Judge Beghe noted in his Kenseth dissent that the view followed in cases like Cotnam and
Clarks does not help alleviate tax burdens on litigants who chose to pay their attorneys by the hour rather
than through a contingent agreement. Kenseth, 114 T.C. at 425 n.15 (Beghe, J., dissenting).
75. See Clarks, 202 F.3d at 857.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

80. Id
81. ld.; see also 3 KLEINROCK'S FED. TAX BULL. 12, available at LEXIS, 2000 Fed. Tax Bull.
LEXIS 140, at *8 (2000).

82. Clarks, 202 F.3d at 857.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 858. "The attorney creates and adds value; the efforts of the attorney contribute to indeed he may be solely responsible for - both the recovery and its augmentation." Kenseth v. Comm'r,
114 T.C. 399, 447 (2000) (Beghe, J., dissenting).
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B. Circuit Courts Finding That the Assignment of Income Doctrine Does Apply
to Payment of Attorneys' Fees
1. Ninth Circuit
In Coady v. Commissioner,' the Coadys received a judgment totaling
$373,307.' This amount consisted of $89,225 of back pay, $76,980 of future lost
earnings, and $207,102 of lost fringe and pension benefits." The Coadys paid
$124,435 of the judgment as attorneys' fees pursuant to a contingent fee
agreement." Also, the Coadys paid $96,902 to their attorneys for litigation
expenses. 9' The Coadys reported the $284,082, which did not represent past wages,
on Schedule C as self-employment income and deducted a proportionate amount of
the attorneys' fees and litigation expenses as self-employment expenses. ' Of the
remaining attorneys' expenses, the Coadys claimed $53,121 as miscellaneous
itemized deductions." The Ninth Circuit disagreed with this treatment and held that
the Coadys were required to include the entire award in gross income. Therefore,
the Coadys could only claim the attorneys' fees as miscellaneous itemized
deductions.' The court noted that Alaska did not give attorneys a superior lien or
ownership interest in the cause of action." The court focused its analysis on the
assignment of income doctrine, holding that the payment of contingent fees
constitutes an assignment of income.'
In determining whether a taxpayer must include the entire amount of litigation
proceeds in gross income, the Coady court held that courts must first examine the
"nature of the underlying action.' 95 Courts should accomplish this by examining
what the payments are compensating. ' The court reasoned that the Coadys' award
compensated them for lost wages and compensation.7 Because wages and
85. 213 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2000).
86. Id. at 1187-88.

87. Id.
88. Id. at 1188.
89. Id.

90. Id.
91. Id. The $53,121 represents the portion of the attorneys' fees and expenses that is proportionate
to the $89,225 of the judgment that the Coadys reported as income from wages. Id.
92. Id. at 1191. An important difference exists between claiming a deduction on Schedule C and

claiming one as an itemized deduction. When taxpayers take deductions on a Schedule C,the entire
amount is allowed and no limitations apply. However, when taxpayers take deductions as miscellaneous
itemized deductions, the limitations imposed by §§ 67 and 68 of the Internal Revenue Code apply to
disallow a portion of the deduction. See supra text accompanying notes 24-30.
93. Coady, 213 F.3d at 1190 (noting that the Alaska statute on attorney liens does not grant

attorneys any ownership interest in the claim or bestow the attorneys with any "power over the suits,
judgments, or decrees of their clients"). To compare with the Wisconsin statute analyzed in Kenseth and
the Alabama statute referred to in Cotnar, see infra note 150.
94. Coady, 213 F.3d at 1190.
95. See id.
96. Id.

97. Id.The issue of the litigant's control over the claim and any resulting judgment may he
immaterial when the proceeds from the litigation represent personal-service income such as lost wages.
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compensation are included in gross income, the litigation award must also be
included in gross income." The fact that the Coadys decided to spend a portion of
that award on attorneys' fees does not change the nature of the underlying purpose
of the award." The court stressed that income is taxed to the persons who earn it
and that an anticipatory assignment to another does not change the character of the
income.'" Furthermore, the court reasoned, any contingent or speculative nature
of the claim does not change the analysis.'
2. Federal Circuit
In Baylin v. United States," a partnership argued that it should not have to
include its contingent attorneys' fees in gross income because (1) the attorney
received the fee directly from the circuit court, and (2) the attorney had a statutory
lien on the proceeds under Maryland state law.'" The United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit disagreed and required the taxpayer to include the
entire amount of the condemnation award in gross income.'" First, the court found
it irrelevant that the partnership never received the portion of the condemnation
award paid directly to its attorneys.'" The partnership benefitted from the
condemnation award by choosing to use a portion of it to pay its attorneys' fees.'"
That the partnership decided to compute the attorneys' fees in reference to the
ultimate recovery does not mean the partnership never "received" that amount as
income.'" The court also found that the attorney lien statute in Maryland did not
grant attorneys an ownership interest.'" The state's lien statute "merely places a
charge upon the fund as security for the debt which is owed to the attorney by his
client."'"

See Kenseth v. Commn'r, 114 T.C. 399, 443 (2000) (Beghe, J.,dissenting); see also infra text
accompanying notes 186-188 and accompanying text.
98. Coady, 213 F.3d at 1190.
99. Id. at 1191.

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id.
Id,
43 F.3d 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
ld at 1454-55.
Id

105. Id. at 1454 (noting that if this argument were given validity it "would elevate form over
substance and allow the partnership to escape taxation on a portion of its income through a 'skillfully
devised' fee arrangement") (quoting Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 115 (1930)); see also supra text
accompanying notes 42-43.

106. L
107. L at 1455. If the taxpayer paid the attorney on an hourly basis, the taxpayer would have to
include the entire amount in gross income. See Baylin v. United States, 30 Fed. CI. 248, 258 (1993).
Under either form of payment, the taxpayer benefitted from the condemnation award by enjoying the
ability to pay its legal fees. Il
108. Baylin, 43 F.3d at 1455.
109. Chanticleer Skyline Room, Inc. v. Greer, 319 A.2d 802, 806 (Md. 1974).
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IV. Statement of the Case: Kenseth v. Commissioner
A. Facts
Mr. Kenseth's confrontation with the Internal Revenue Service began when he
contacted a law firm, seeking legal representation against his employer, APV
Crepaco, Inc. (APV), for alleged employment discrimination. Kenseth entered into
a contingent fee agreement with Fox & Fox, S.C., the law firm that served as his
legal representative in the suit against APV." °
After Fox & Fox filed a complaint against APV in the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Wisconsin, Kenseth entered into a settlement agreement with
APV and received a total amount of $229,501." Pursuant to the settlement,
$32,476 was designated as lost wages."' From this amount, APV withheld federal
and state employment taxes, leaving a net amount of $21,246."' The settlement
agreement described the remaining $197,024 as "personal injury damages which the
parties intend as those types of damages excludable from income under section
104(a)(2)' 14 of the Internal Revenue Code... and the corresponding provisions of
the Tax Code of the State of Wisconsin.""' APV wrote the check to the Fox &
Fox trust account.' According to the contingent fee agreement, Fox & Fox was
entitled to 40%, or $91,800.54, of the gross amount, $229,501.37."' After
deducting the fee, Fox & Fox wrote a check to Kenseth for the net amount of
$105,724.22. " s
On his 1993 federal income tax return, Kenseth only reported as income the
portion of the total settlement designated as wages ($32,476.61)."' Kenseth did
not report as income the sum designated as personal injury damages, and he did not
claim a deduction for any portion of the attorneys' fees associated with the
litigation." The Commissioner issued a notice of deficiency to Kenseth, which
increased his gross income by $197,024 - the portion of the settlement award that
Kenseth did not report as income."' Also, the notice permitted Kenseth to claim
the $91,800 of attorneys' fees as an itemized deduction." However, that amount
allowed as an itemized deduction was reduced by $5298 pursuant to the 2% floor
on miscellaneous itemized deductions required by § 67 of the Internal Revenue

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Kenseth v. Commr, 114 T.C. 399, 400 (2000).
Id at 404.

Id.
Id.
I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (2000).
Kenseth, 114 T.C. at 404-05.
Id at 405.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Id.
Id.
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Code." The deduction was further reduced by $4694 for the overall limitation on
itemized deductions under § 68.24 The total tax deficiency of $55,037 included
$17,198 of alternative minimum tax. Application of § 56 of the Internal Revenue
Code created the additional $17,198 in tax liability by disallowing a miscellaneous
itemized deduction for attorneys' fees."
Kenseth brought suit in the United States Tax Court, conceding that the
settlement proceeds were not excludable in their entirety." However, he argued
that he should not have to include in gross income that portion of the settlement
paid to Fox & Fox pursuant to the contingent fee agreement.'27 Kenseth believed
that he "exercised insufficient control over the settlement proceeds used to pay Fox
& Fox" and that he "should ... not be taxed on amounts to which [he] had no
'legal' right and could not, and did not, receive."'" The issue before the Tax Court
was whether the portion of the settlement agreement used to pay the attorneys'
contingent fee must be included in the taxpayer's gross income.
B. Holding
The Tax Court rejected petitioner's arguments and agreed with the Commissioner
that the entire settlement proceeds, including the portion paid as contingent
attorneys' fees, must be included in Kenseth's gross income.' The court further
held that Kenseth could claim the cost of his legal fees as a miscellaneous itemized
deduction.' However, the deduction would be reduced by the limitations imposed
under §§ 56, 67, and 68 of the Internal Revenue Code.'
C. Reasoning
The Kenseth court first looked to statutory requirements. Section 61(a)12 states
that "gross income means all income from whatever source derived."'3 The court
reasoned that no Internal Revenue Code provision specifically excludes from gross
income those portions of settlement proceeds used to pay contingent attorneys'
fees.'" Therefore, the entire settlement amount must be included in Kenseth's
gross income.' The court viewed it as irrelevant that Kenseth did not actually
receive that portion of the settlement before paying Fox & Fox because Kenseth

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id. at 405-06.
Id. at 406.
ld.; see also I.R.C. § 56(b)(1)(A)(i) (2000).
Kenseth, 114 T.C. at 406.
Ld.
Id. at 406-07.
Id. at 407, 412.
Id. at 411.
Id. at 407, 417.
Id.; see also I.R.C. § 61(a) (2000).
Kenseth, 114 T.C. at 413.
Id.
Id.
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received "the full benefit of those funds in the form of payment for the services
required to obtain the settlement."'"
Further, the court reasoned, the assignment of income doctrine prohibits a
taxpayer from avoiding taxation through an anticipatory assignment of such
income."7 Accordingly, the court required Kenseth to pay taxes on the amount of
the settlement anticipatorily assigned to Fox & Fox." The Tax Court declined to
find any importance in the speculative nature of the claim or the necessity of hiring
attorneys to pursue the lawsuit and obtain the judgment.' The court reasoned that
Kenseth had been discriminated against before hiring Fox & Fox and, therefore, had
already earned the damages.'" Kenseth was entitled to the settlement award long
before he ever hired Fox & Fox to represent him. 4' Fox & Fox merely enabled
Kenseth to retrieve the damages owed.' Because Kenseth was the only person
discriminated against, there could not have been a joint venture between Kenseth
and Fox & Fox.'"
Kenseth argued that when he entered the contingent agreement, he lost sufficient
control over those funds so that the assignment of income doctrine did not
apply.'" The Court rejected this argument,1 S reasoning that the client, not the
attorney, retains control over the settlement and disposition of the lawsuit." In

fact, it is unethical for lawyers to pursue a course of action against the consent of
their clients. 47

136. Id.
137. See id.. But see Srivastava v. Comm'r, 220 F.3d 353, 362-63 (5th Cir. 2000) (noting that most
clients do not enter contingent fee agreements to avoid taxation, but to retain an attorney without
incurring current costs).
138. Kenseth, 114 T.C. at 413. But see Deborah A. Geier, Letters to the Editor, Attorney's Fees
Debate Continues, 88 TAX NOTES 827, 827-28 (2000) (noting that "it is not all clear that a contingent-fee
agreement operates to 'assign' a portion of assignable 'property' income. It is just as reasonable.., to
argue that the relationship between the parties is that of service recipient to service provider").
139. Kenseth, 114 T.C. at 413 (noting that if Kenseth's claim had no value, then Fox & Fox
probably would have declined to provide representation on a contingent basis).
140. Id.; see also Geier, supra note 138, at 828 (stating that the burden of proof is on the taxpayer
to show that the "contingent-fee contract operated to assign income for tax purposes").
141. See Kenseth, 114 T.C. at 413.
142. See id.
143. See id.
144. Id. at 414; see also Srivastava v. Comm'r, 220 F.3d 353, 364 (5th Cir. 2000) ("[A] taxpayer
who enters into a contingent fee contract divests some measure of control over a claim but retains the
rest, and how much control is sufficient to trigger taxation under the anticipatory assignment of income
doctrine is not easily answerable.").
145. Kenseth, 114 T.C. at 414.
146. Id.
147. Id. However, clause VI of the contingent fee agreement with Fox & Fox stated:
CLIENT WILL NOT SETTLE WITHOUT ATI'ORNEYS' CONSENT
The client will not compromise or settle the case without the written consent of the
attorneys. The client agrees not to waive the right to attorneys' fees as part of a settlement
unless the client has reached an agreement with the attorney for an alternative method of
payment that would compensate the attorneys in accordance with Section III of this
agreement.
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Finally, the court refused to base its decision on the attorney lien rationale. 48
The Wisconsin statute would not result in an exclusion of the fees from gross
income. " 9 Unlike the Alabama statute in Cotnam, the Wisconsin statute did not
give the attorney the same rights as their clients to the cause of action.'"' Thus,
the Tax Court stands strong behind its prior holdings that contingent fees represent
taxable income under the assignment of income doctrine. The Tax Court has the
power, however, to render a more equitable decision for taxpayers.
V. Analysis
A. Courts Have the Power to Remedy the Inequity of Judge-Made Law
The Tax Court's decision in Kenseth is extremely unfavorable to taxpayers. Under
Kenseth, taxpayers may have to pay tax on money they never receive.'' For
instance, after application of the itemized deduction rules in conjunction with the
alternative minimum tax, the overall effective tax rate ends up exceeding 50% of

the net recovery when the contingent attorneys' fees amount to more than 50% of
the recovery."

When the total attorneys' fees exceed 72-73% of the total

recovery, the total tax liability can exceed the total net recovery.'

In rendering

its decision, the Tax Court did acknowledge the degree of inequity to taxpayers."
However, the majority blamed the resulting unfairness on Congress and the
application of §§ 56, 67, and 68 of the Internal Revenue Code.' The Tax Court
stated that because Congress enacted these provisions, Congress, not the courts,

Id. at 401.
148. Id. at 415; cf. Srivastava,220 F.3d at 364 ("[Ihe answer does not depend on the intricacies
of an attorney's bundle of rights against the opposing party under the law of the governing state.").
149. See Kenseth, 114 T.C. at 415.
150. IM.The court stated:
[IThe Wisconsin] statute provides for an attorney's lien upon the cause of action or upon
the proceeds or damages from such cause of action to secure compensation, but it does
not give attorneys the same rights as their clients over the proceeds of suits, judgments,
and decrees. Accordingly, the Wisconsin statute contains obvious differences and is
distinguishable from the Alabama statute.
Id. (emphasis omitted). The Alabama attorney lien statute examined in Cotnam provided as follows:
2. Upon suits, judgments, and decrees for money, they shall have a lien superior to all
liens but tax liens, and no person shall be at liberty to satisfy said suit, judgment or
decree, until the lien or claim of the attorney for his fees is fully satisfied; and attorneys
at law shall have the same right and power over said suits, judgments and decrees, to
enforce their liens, as their clients had or may have for the amount due thereon to them.
Cotnam v. Comm'r, 263 F.2d 119, 125 n.5 (5th Cir. 1959) (quoting ALA. CODE § 64 (1940)).
151. See Jeffrey S. Dible, Income Tax Reporting of Attorney Fees (andDamages), 43 REs GESTAE,
Aug. 1999, at 11; see also Wood, supranote 58, at 575 (stating that a taxpayer might end up paying tax
on the portion of the award the attorney received); I.R.C. § 63(c) (2000).
152. See Kenseth, 114 T.C. at 425 (Beghe, J., dissenting); see also Wood, supra note 58, at 576.
153. See Kenseth, 114 T.C. at 415.
154. Id. at 415.
155. Id. at 407, 415; see also supra text accompanying notes 12-17, 25, 28, 36 (discussing the
effects of §§ 56, 67, and 68 of the Internal Revenue Code upon the tax liability of litigants deducting
attorneys' fees).
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must rectify such harshness." 5 The majority indicated that it had no option to
render a different decision because courts should not engage in "ad hoc modification
of established tax law principles... to counteract hardship in specific cases. '
To prevent this unfairness, one must first determine the source of the inequity
and who has the authority to remedy it. Obviously, Congress determines the
ultimate tax liability imposed by the Internal Revenue Code, and courts are bound
to apply the Tax Code. Congress established the rules for itemized deductions and
the alternative minimum tax, and therefore Congress should take action to change
the disparaging effects."" However, the Tax Court did not specifically rely upon
the Internal Revenue Code when it ruled upon the facts of Kenseth. Rather, the
Tax Court looked to the assignment of income doctrine. The Supreme Court, not
Congress, created the assignment of income doctrine."' Consequently, the Tax
Court could have prevented the harsh result by examining its application of this
judge-made doctrine."w
Five of the thirteen judges dissented from the decision; thus, close to half of
the court felt that it did have the power to render a more equitable decision.
Judge Beghe's dissent "deserves particular emphasis because he was the trial
judge in the case ... if this case had not been designated to be reviewed by the
court, the decision would have come out differently. Judge Beghe simply would
have ruled for the taxpayer .....
Judge Beghe disagreed that the courts do not have the power to remedy the
injustice arising from decisions like Kenseth." "What the courts have created
and applied, courts can interpret, refine, and distinguish to determine whether in
changed circumstances
the conditions for application of the doctrine have been
satisfied.""'6

156. Kenseth, 114 T.C. at 415. But see Robert W. Wood, Letters to the Editor: The Energizer
Bunny Has Nothing on the Attorneys' Fee Debate, 88 TAX NoTEs 1059, 1059 (2000). One commentator
has stated:
Congress could resolve it .... But there are at least two other possibilities. One is that
it will be resolved by the appellate courts (the U.S. Supreme Court resolving the split
among the circuits). The other possibility ... is that the five Tax Court judges who
dissented in Kenseth may convince the rest of the Tax Court to start deciding all of these
cases on a consistent basis - consistently in favor of the taxpayer.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
157. Kenseth, 114 T.C. at 407.
158. See Geier, supra note 138, at 828 (arguing that attorneys' fees should be fully deductible and
not subject to the limitations of § 67, § 68, and the alternative minimum tax, and that Congress, not the
courts, is responsible for this change). But see Kenseth, 114 T.C. at 427 (Beghe, J., dissenting).
159. See Kenseth, 114 T.C. at 427 (Beghe, J., dissenting).
160. See id
161. See Wood, supranote 58, at 576. When the court reviews a case, as in Kenseth, it means that
the entire Tax Court examined it. See id. at 575. Very few cases ever get this type of treatment. See id.
162. See Kenseth, 114 T.C. at 442 (Beghe, J., dissenting); see also Wood, supra note 58, at 573
(noting that the assignment of income doctrine is "probably not the most effective or applicable basis for
the IRS or the courts to use" in these cases); Wood, supra note 156, at 1059 (noting that the discharge
of indebtedness doctrine is more applicable than the assignment of income doctrine).
163. See Kenseth, 114 T.C. at 427 (Beghe, J., dissenting); see also Wood, supra note 58, at 575.
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B. The Assignment of Income Doctrine Was InappropriatelyApplied to Kenseth
Because the Tax Court based its decision upon a judicially created doctrine, it
had the latitude to decide whether the doctrine was created for factual circumstances similar to those in Kenseth. The Tax Court erred in holding that the
assignment of income doctrine applies to the transaction in Kenseth. In Lucas v.
Earl,the Supreme Court created the assignment of income doctrine to prevent tax
avoidance through assignments of income from a person in a higher tax bracket
to those in lower tax brackets. The primary reason the assignment of income
doctrine should not have been applied is that Kenseth did not engage in a tax
avoidance scheme. Kenseth involved a nongratuitous transfer rather than a
gratuitous assignment. In nongratuitous assignments, the taxpayer assigns the
income in exchange for adequate consideration rather than making a gratuitous
gift."' Kenseth did not give the money to his attorney as a gratuity. Rather,
Kenseth transferred a percentage of his claim in the litigation in exchange for
legal representation. Because Kenseth's motive resembles something other than
tax avoidance, application of the assignment of income doctrine would not further
the stated purpose of "preserv[ing] the integrity of the graduated tax rate
schedule."'65 If anything, reliance on the doctrine results in double taxation of
the portion paid for the contingent fee.
Gratuitous assignments of income pose no threat of double taxation because the
assignee excludes the assigned income from his gross income under § 102' of
the Internal Revenue Code.'67 For instance, in Lucas, the husband was liable for
paying the tax liability for his total earned income for the year. Under § 102, the
wife was exempted from any tax liability even though she was assigned half of
the income. Similarly, the father in Horst was responsible for paying the tax on
the interest and the son owed nothing. In these gratuitous assignments, the total
income is taxed only once. However, § 102 does not apply to nongratuitous assignments.'" If the assignor is not exempted from paying tax on the assigned
income, both the assignor and the assignee will pay tax on the same income."
Under this theory, double taxation occurs in Kenseth because Kenseth must
include the entire settlement award in his gross income, but he is not allowed a
full deduction for the entire amount of attorneys' fees. Simultaneously, Kenseth's
attorney must also report the contingent fee as income under § 61(a)(1). As long

Tihe law on the tax treatment of attorneys' fees depends on the particular jurisdiction in
which the taxpayer finds himself. The Tax Court is bound to follow the law in the
particular circuit in which the Tax Court is sitting at the time, so there is inconsistent
treatment even in the Tax Court. The tax authorities are supposed to look to state law too,
which varies.
Id. at 574; see also supra note 11.
164. See Jensen, supranote 37, at 633.
165. Id.
166. I.R.C. § 102 (2000).
167. See Jensen, supranote 37, at 635.
168. Section 102 applies only to gifts. I.R.C. § 102 (2000).
169. See Jensen, supra note 37, at 635.
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as nongratuitous transactions are negotiated at arm's length, the assignor should
only be taxed on that portion of the income not assigned.'
Application of the doctrine to the facts of Kenseth did not uphold the original,
intended purpose of the doctrine - elimination of tax avoidance. Because the
majority opinion admits that its decision had an unfair result, it should reconsider
why it continues to apply the judicially created doctrine to any assignment
regardless of the underlying motive. However, even if the court wanted to extend
application of the doctrine to situations other than tax avoidance, the facts of
Kenseth do not demonstrate an assignment of income.
The doctrine has traditionally been applied to intrafamily donative transfers like
Lucas and Horst, rather than commercial transactions in which the parties have
no preexisting mutual interest."" Intrafamily cases principally focused on how
much control the assignor retained over the assigned income." In many
intrafamily transfers the transferred income never really left the family, and
therefore the transferor retained some control over the income after it had been
transferred.'" Consequently, the transferor continued to enjoy benefits from the
income. To determine whether an assignment of income has occurred, courts
must consider whether the assignor maintained the requisite degree of control over
the income so that the assignor should be treated as the payee of the income for
tax purposes. 7 The assignment of income cases focus on control in order to
identify those intrafamily transfers designed to avoid tax liability.
In contrast, Kenseth relinquished considerable control over the award, and he
should be entitled to a complete exclusion from gross income for that portion for
several reasons. 7 First, Fox & Fox refused to represent Kenseth unless he
entered the fee agreement and agreed to the attorney lien." Second, Kenseth
could not settle the case without the approval of the law firm. 7 ' This diminished
the amount of control that Kenseth had over the final amount awarded.' APV
might have offered Kenseth a sum that Kenseth wanted. Under their agreement,
Kenseth had no control to accept the settlement if Fox & Fox refused. Third, if
Kenseth decided to fire Fox & Fox, the firm would still have a lien for the fees
agreed to and for any accrued expenses." Finally, the contingent fee portion
of the settlement award was paid directly to Fox & Fox, and therefore Kenseth

170. See id.
171. See Kenseth v. Comm'r, 114 T.C. 399, 441 (2000) (Beghe, J., dissenting); see also Wood,
supra note 58, at 575; MERTENS, supranote 44, § 24A:42.15 (noting that the early Supreme Court cases
that created the assignment of income doctrine all "involved intra-family or related-party transfer[s]").
172. Kenseth, 114 T.C. at 441-42 (Beghe, J., dissenting).
173. Id at 441 (Beghe, J., dissenting).

174. Id.
175. Id.
176. See id. at 442 (Beghe, J.,dissenting); see also Geier, supra note 138, at 827 n.4.
dissenting).
177. Kenseth, 114 T.C. at 422 (Beghe, J.,

dissenting).
178. Id at 444 (Beghe, J.,
179. See id.
at 403.
180.
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never even had possession of the amount paid as attorneys' fees."' In support
of his position, Judge Beghe cited a 1964 American Bar Foundation study of
contingent fees. The study found that under contingent agreements, attorneys have
a very high degree of control over "prosecution, settlement, and recovery of
plaintiffs claims.""
Judge Beghe's opinion states that contingent fee agreements are comparable to
contracts of adhesion."U He did not argue that the contingent fee agreement
should be unenforceable or that the agreement was so unfair as to make it
unenforceable. "' Rather, he claimed the similarity of the agreement to a contract
of adhesion supports the contention that Kenseth lacked control over the
claim."9 An assignor's lack of control may be irrelevant when the assigned
income is personal-service income, as in Lucas." Both the Coady court and the
Kenseth court argued that the income was personal-service income, that the
taxpayer earned it before he assigned it away through the contingency agreement.
However, Kenseth's settlement did not represent personal-service income. '"
Although the settlement did take into account loss of past earnings and future
income, Kenseth's claim originated from constitutional rights of a protected status,
rather than a bargain over a personal-service contract.'"
[W]here a claim based on status, such as an ADEA claim, is the
subject of a contingent fee agreement, the amount paid the attorney
as a result of his successful prosecution of the claim is much more
personal service income of the attorney than personal service income
of the claimant, however the claimant's share of the income might be
characterized for tax purposes. '"
The tax liability imposed upon Kenseth resulted from the provisions of the

Internal Revenue Code. However, Kenseth only came within the purview of §
61(a) after the Tax Court applied the assignment of income doctrine and ruled
that the portion of the settlement paid to Fox & Fox was Kenseth's income
"assigned" away. Courts can avoid the inequity of the Tax Code by seeking to

apply the assignment of income doctrine in a manner that upholds the doctrine's
original purpose.

181. d at405.
182. See id. at 445 (Beghe, J., dissenting).

183. There are seven characteristics that define a contract of adhesion; all these characteristics are
present in the contingent fee agreement between Kenseth and Fox & Fox. Id. at 444 n.49 (Beghe, J.,
dissenting).
184. See id. at 444-45 (Beghe, J., dissenting). "[C]ontracts of adhesion are prima facie enforceable
as written." Id.
185. Id. at 445 (Bege, J., dissenting).
186. See id. at 442 (Beghe, J., dissenting).
187. Id. at 443 (Beghe, J., dissenting).
188. Id.
189. Id
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VI. Current State of the Law and Proposed Changes
In those circuits that have not yet reviewed this tax issue, the Tax Court's
decision serves as the guideline. Thus, attorneys will now have to factor these tax
consequences into the structuring of settlements. Any client who wins a judgment
must include the entire amount of the award in his gross income and is allowed
to claim an itemized deduction for the cost of attorneys' fees.'" One possible
planning device that might help alleviate the financial burden of Kenseth is to
spread out payment of the proceeds in order to reduce the amount of alternative
minimum tax owed. 9' By spreading out the recovery over several years, clients
will not have as much additional income as if they received the entire amount in
one year. Therefore, the taxpayer increases his chances of having an alternative
minimum tax that is less than his regular tax liability. Additional proposals for
alleviating the tax burden of Kenseth include encouraging Congress to change the
tax laws to allow for a "meaningful deduction of the attorneys' fees."'"
Plaintiffs would no longer have to deal with the limitations placed
on deducting attorneys' fees such as the two percent floor on
miscellaneous itemized deductions, the AMT, and the phaseout of
itemized deductions. The exclusion approach would foster uniformity
in the application of the Code to attorneys' fees .... An exclusion of
the attorneys' fees from income would also eliminate the application
of the AMT to this nonabusive area. 9"
Also, Congress could eliminate the portion of the AMT that does not allow a
deduction for attorneys' fees.' This option is a compromise because while it
eliminates the AMT problem, it does not eliminate the 2% floor or the phaseout
of the miscellaneous itemized deduction.'" A congressional revision of the Tax
Code would be the optimal resolution to the inequities of cases like Kenseth.
However, the courts do not have to stand idly by waiting for such congressional
action. There would have been no assignment of income issue if the Supreme
Court had not created the doctrine in Lucas v. Earl. The courts addressed the
issue when it first arose, and courts have the responsibility of examining and
defining the scope of its continued application.

190. The Tax Court has shown that in those jurisdictions where the appellate courts have not yet
ruled on the issue, the Tax Court will follow the rule set forth in Kenseth. See supra note 11.
191. See Forman, supra note 12.
192. Davis, supra note 51, at 1723 (noting that this could be accomplished by "amending § 104 to
exclude contingency-based attorneys' fees paid as a result of a taxable damage award").
193. Id.; see also Sager & Cohen, supra note 36.
194. Davis, supra note 51, at 1724.
195. See id. (noting that elimination of the AMT would offer some relief to taxpayers, but that
changing the AMT would further complicate the Tax Code).
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Conclusion
The assignment of income doctrine is intended to prevent tax avoidance
schemes whereby an individual in a higher tax bracket assigns some of his
income to an individual in a lower tax bracket. This normally occurs in an
intrafamily situation. In Kenseth, the taxpayer "assigned" income to a law firm.
Most large law firms will not be in a lower tax bracket than their clients.
Therefore, the Internal Revenue Service will not lose tax revenues by allowing
taxpayers to exclude the amount of a settlement paid as a contingent fee.
Contrary to the majority's pronouncement in Kenseth, courts do have the power
to reverse the burdensome effects of decisions like Kenseth by reexamining the
purpose of the assignment of income doctrine and modifying when and where it
should apply.
Aubree Helvey

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2001

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol54/iss4/6

